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Abstract
The problem of link prediction has recently received increasing attention from scholars in
network science. In social network analysis, one of its aims is to recover missing links,
namely connections among actors which are likely to exist but have not been reported
because data are incomplete or subject to various types of uncertainty. In the field of crimi-
nal investigations, problems of incomplete information are encountered almost by definition,
given the obvious anti-detection strategies set up by criminals and the limited investigative
resources. In this paper, we work on a specific dataset obtained from a real investigation,
and we propose a strategy to identify missing links in a criminal network on the basis of the
topological analysis of the links classified as marginal, i.e. removed during the investigation
procedure. The main assumption is that missing links should have opposite features with
respect to marginal ones. Measures of node similarity turn out to provide the best character-
ization in this sense. The inspection of the judicial source documents confirms that the pre-
dicted links, in most instances, do relate actors with large likelihood of co-participation in
illicit activities.
Introduction
Criminal intelligence analysis aims at supporting investigations, e.g. by producing link charts
to identify and target key actors. Law enforcement agencies increasingly use Social Network
Analysis (SNA) for criminal intelligence, analyzing the relations among individuals based on
information on activities, events, and places derived from various investigative activities [1–3].
SNA provides added value compared to more traditional approaches like link analysis, by
enabling in-depth assessment of the internal structure of criminal groups and by providing
strategic and tactical advantages. For instance, SNA can inform law enforcement officers in the
identification of aliases during large investigations and in the collection of evidence for prose-
cution [2]. Furthermore, the network analysis of criminal groups under investigation may help
identify effective strategies to achieve network destabilization or disruption [3, 4].
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Given the sensitiveness and implications of criminal proceedings, criminal intelligence and
investigations strive for achieving the most accurate representation of each case. Information
gathering and selection are crucial steps, due to the implications of both type I (false positive)
and type II (false negative) errors. A number of controls and procedural safeguards are in place
to prevent false positives (i.e. wrong accusations). Investigators, prosecutors, and courts rou-
tinely deal with irrelevant information by discarding it throughout the proceedings and keep-
ing only material useful to build a case [5]. Contrarily, the inherently covert nature of criminal
activities makes investigations more vulnerable to false negatives (i.e. missing information),
with very limited solutions available to the law enforcement agencies due to time and resource
constraints.
Missing information is also the main challenge for SNA of criminal networks. Law enforce-
ment data from wiretap or other investigative sources are inevitably incomplete. Criminals
often use communication and protection methods to decrease the effectiveness of law enforce-
ment action [6]. Investigators rely on data-gathering methods, e.g. observations, archives,
informants, witnesses, that results in incomplete information and thus a partial vision of the
network under investigation [5, 7–9]. The lack of data generates problems of uncertain infor-
mation, potentially jeopardizing the effectiveness of the investigations [3]. In the analysis of
criminal networks, missing data can refer to missing nodes and/or missing links [7].
Missing nodes often depend on the scope and focus of the investigations. In turn, these may
affect the specification of network boundaries, i.e. the definition of rules of inclusion of actors
and their relations in the network [10–12]. Law enforcement agencies may overlook some
important actors, especially if they take precautions against detection [5]. Research has shown
that some skilled criminals assume a strategic position in criminal networks by balancing secu-
rity and active involvement. Whereas intensive interaction with others normally increases the
criminals’ performance, it also affects their visibility and consequently the vulnerability to law
enforcement targeting. Some key players (e.g. the boss in a mafia) will avoid direct involvement
in the illicit activities to reduce the risk of identification and arrest [13–15]. Nevertheless, the
literature points out that even the most skilled criminals may hardly avoid detection in long
lasting and intensive investigations, particularly if they have an important role in a criminal
group [15].
Missing links instead refer to the lack of information on the relations between two known
criminals. The police may miss meetings, conversations, and plans about criminal activities
[5, 16]. For instance, criminals may use different telephone lines, according to the nature of the
conversation and the interlocutor, and investigators may be able to identify only some of them.
The frequent change of mobile phones and SIM cards and the use of particular lines to commu-
nicate with high-ranking affiliates may also prevent law enforcement agencies from identifying
all conversations among suspects [17]. This results in incomplete information which may hin-
der or mislead investigations. Scholars and practitioners in criminology and criminal justice
have often acknowledged the problem of missing links [5, 7, 16, 18]. Yet, studies on the their
identification in criminal networks are still rare [19–21]. This is surprising, not only given the
significant growth of works on missing links in other fields with the development of a number
of different strategies [22–26], but also given that criminal investigations face the problem of
missing links almost by definition, due to the scarcity of investigative resources and the anti-
detection strategies by criminals [20].
This paper proposes an innovative strategy to identify possible missing links in a criminal
network. It draws from the literature on link prediction and applies it on a unique dataset
based on a real investigation. Differently from previous studies, the main assumption is that
missing links may have characteristics contrary to those of marginal links discarded during the
investigation. Indeed, while some links are ordinarily removed from a criminal network due to
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their marginality, other links with opposite characteristics may be missing due to lack of infor-
mation. The analysis thus infers missing links a contrario from the characteristics of marginal
links actually removed throughout the proceedings. The possible missing links so detected are
highly probable social ties whose existence should be investigated by law enforcement agencies.
Their identification during ongoing investigations may support law enforcement agencies in
the allocation of scarce investigative resources, especially in the case of large criminal networks,
and therefore improve the law enforcement action.
Methods
The Oversize dataset
The analysis relies on a unique dataset from operation Oversize, an Italian criminal case against
a mafia group. The investigation lasted from 2000 to 2006, and targeted more than 50 suspects
involved in international drug trafficking, homicides, and robberies. The trial started in 2007
and lasted until 2009, when the judgment was passed, and the main suspects were convicted
with penalties from 5 to 22 years of imprisonment. Most suspects were affiliated to the ‘Ndran-
gheta, a mafia from Calabria (a southern Italian region) with ramifications in other regions and
abroad [27, 28].
Contrarily to most empirical studies on criminal networks, which rely on data derived from
a single source of information, Oversize’s peculiarity lies in the availability of three networks
from three judicial documents corresponding to three different stages of the criminal proceed-
ings [16]: the wiretap records (WR), the arrest warrant (AW), and the judgment (JU). The
wiretap records include all wiretap conversations transcribed by the police and considered rele-
vant at first glance. The arrest warrant contains a selection of the transcripts and other relevant
information from informants and other investigative activities (e.g. physical surveillance). The
judgment summarizes the trial and includes information from several sources of evidence,
including wiretapping and audio surveillance. It is worth mentioning that the documents
related to the arrest warrant and judgment are public [29, 30], whereas wiretap records are not
publicly available because they report private conversations involving people other than sus-
pects (access was obtained by the authors through a special permission). Nonetheless, the three
networks, derived from a thorough, exhaustive analysis of the textual judicial documents [16],
can be made public because no personal or sensitive information is reported (see Data Avail-
ability Statement).
Most studies on criminal networks focus on one or a small number of case studies, and rely
on a single source of information [4, 7, 16, 18, 28, 31], because access to data is difficult to
obtain, particularly in the case of wiretap records. The main limitation of a case study approach
concerns the external validity of the findings, i.e. the extent to which the results can be general-
ized beyond the case studies [32]. The analysis of the Oversize dataset focuses on a single crimi-
nal network thus sharing similar limitations on external validity with previous studies. The
peculiarity of the dataset (i.e. the availability of three networks) prevents replication on other
cases. Yet, it simultaneously constitutes the strength and innovation of the current study
because it enables observation of the discarded marginal links and the prediction of possible
missing links.
The individuals involved in illicit activities constitute the nodes of the networks, the links
indicate a relation between any two actors. We restrict the analysis to the undirected case, i.e.
we neglect the directionality of links. The three networks are formally defined by Ni = (V, Ei),
i =WR, AW, JU, where V is the set of nodes (the same for all networks, with |V| = 182 nodes)
and Ei is the set of links of network i. We denote by (x, y), with x, y 2 V, any pair of nodes of
network, be they connected by a link, i.e. (x, y) 2 Ei, or not. The number cxy of telephone calls
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recorded between individuals (nodes) (x, y) is available for all (x, y) 2 Ei. Table 1 summarizes
the main statistics of the three networks. We recall that the degree kx of a node x is the number
of links incident to x, i.e. the number of neighbor nodes. A node is isolated if kx = 0. The density
of the network is the ratio between the number of existing links |Ei| and their maximum possi-
ble number |V|(|V| − 1)/2.
The networks are simultaneously displayed in Fig 1. The Oversize networks show some fea-
tures typical of illicit networks. Many criminal organizations analyzed in the literature exhibit
the presence of a core of few highly-connected nodes and a large number of peripheral actors
[4, 7, 28, 33–35]. Fig 1 highlights (through node coloring) the result of the k-shell core-
periphery analysis [36]: nodes are partitioned into “concentric” layers (or shells), starting from
the periphery and arriving to the core of the network. Each node is assigned to a shell: the
1-shell contains the most peripheral nodes, the 2-shell those which are in the layer immediately
more internal, and so on. More in detail, the algorithm for k-shell decomposition can be sum-
marized as follows [36]: put in the 1-shell (and remove) all nodes with degree kx = 1, and then
all nodes having kx 1 after removal of the former; put in the 2-shell (and remove) all nodes
with kx = 2, and then all nodes having kx 2 after removal of the former; etc. The procedure
stops when all nodes have been classified in a k-shell. In the NWR network, 4 shells are identi-
fied: they include, from the periphery to the core, 123, 33, 19, and 7 nodes, respectively, thus
confirming the presence of a core of few actors and a large number of peripheral individuals.
Network reduction and marginal links
In passing from NWR to NAW, 58 of the 247 links of NWR are removed (thus EWR EAW) creat-
ing 36 isolated nodes. Similarly, in passing from NWR to NJU, 134 links are removed (EWR
EJU) creating 93 isolated nodes. However, the links of NJU are not a subset of those of NAW, i.e.
the two reductions are not in cascade. This is normal, as subsequent phases of the criminal pro-
ceedings may generate new information, e.g. from witnesses or additional investigative
activities.
Fig 1 highlights the links removed in the network reduction processes (i.e. from NWR to
NAW, and from NWR to NJU). The removed links are in most cases associated to a small
number of telephone calls (Fig 2). In the original network NWR, the number of calls cxy ranges
from 1 to 52, with average value hcxyi = 3.95. On the other hand, the sets of removed links have
hcxyiWR ! AW = 1.59 (ranging from 1 to 6) and hcxyiWR ! JU = 2.53 (from 1 to 20). None of the
links with highest number of calls is removed. To substantiate this observation, we repeatedly
select at random (for 105 repetitions) 58 or 134 links from NWR, namely the same number of
links removed, respectively, from NWR to NAW and from NWR to NJU. It turns out (see the right
panels in Fig 2) that the average number of calls of the links actually removed is extremely
small, such that the probability of randomly selecting a smaller value is almost zero in both
Table 1. Statistics of the Oversize networks.
Wiretap Records Arrest warrant Judgement
n. of nodes (|V|) 182 182 182
n. of isolated nodes 0 36 93
n. of links (|Ei|) 247 189 113
density 0.015 0.011 0.007
average degree 2.7 2.1 1.2
max degree 32 29 13
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154244.t001
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cases. It can safely be claimed that the link removal process tends to be biased by the intensity
of the contacts between individuals, as the links with lower intensity are more likely to be
removed.
The removed links often connect two individuals who had occasional contacts during the
two-year investigation. In some cases, they concern pairs of actors who had telephone conver-
sations in a few occasions and for very specific purposes (e.g. the purchase of small quantities
of drugs). For instance, n63 (we refer to individuals by means of their anonymized label) was
involved in a small number of telephone conversations with different retailers to arrange the
purchase of small quantities of drugs in different occasions during the investigation. However,
Fig 1. The Oversize networks. The links removed in passing from NWR (Wiretap Records) to NAW (Arrest
Warrant) (above), or from NWR to NJU (Judgement) (below), are highlighted in red. Nodes are colored
according to their coreness, based on the k-shell analysis of theNWR network: 1 = white (most peripheral),
2 = yellow, 3 = orange, 4 = brown (most central).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154244.g001
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since he was not involved in the trafficking activities, nor in other serious crimes, the links
between him and the other alleged criminals were discarded by the police when passing from
NWR to NAW. In other occasions, the links removed from the network involved at least one
individual who had not been identified by the police. Indeed, 11 out of the 58 links discarded
from NWR to NAW involved individuals who participated in (minor) illicit activities and are
reported in the judicial documents with the initials “V.M.” (male voice) of “V.F.” (female
voice), or with the name or nickname mentioned in the telephone conversations. The same
applies to 32 links out of the 134 removed when passing from NWR to NJU.
Other removed links with low intensity concern conversations about issues unrelated to the
main illicit activities conducted by the members of the criminal group. Two examples are indic-
ative of this type of links. In one occasion, n40 and n39 discuss about the debts that a third per-
son has towards n39; in another occasion, n49 informs n26 of the arrest of another member of
the group. In both cases, the links are formed as a consequence of an occasional communica-
tion between two individuals. Such communications may be useful to have a complete picture
of the criminal network, but the links did not represent stable communication channels or rela-
tions among network members, nor they added any relevant information to the investigation
process and they were discarded by the police.
Although it is certainly true that many removals involve peripheral nodes (especially in the
NWR to NJU case), the visual inspection of Fig 1 reveals that many removals concern links
Fig 2. Statistics on the number of calls cxy of the removed links. Left panels: in green, the histogram of
the number of calls of the links of NWR. In yellow, the number of calls of the links removed in passing from NWR
to NAW (above, 58 removals), and from NWR to NJU (below, 134 removals). Right panels: the distribution of the
average number of calls of a random sample of 58 links (above) or 134 links (below) of NWR, compared with
the average number of calls (red vertical line) of the links actually removed from NWR to NAW (above) and from
NWR to NJU (below).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154244.g002
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which are instead connected, on one or both sides, to nodes with medium/large coreness. It
cannot be claimed, therefore, that the network reduction is a process trivially involving the net-
work periphery only. On the other end, we already pointed out that the intensity of the contacts
(number of telephone calls) seems to be associated with the classification of marginal links by
the police (see Fig 2). However, this quantity cannot be used for link prediction, since it cannot
be associated in a straightforward way to a potential (non detected) link whose likelihood we
want to quantify. As a matter of fact, there is no obvious way to associate a “predicted weight”
to a predicted (thus non observed) link.
In the following, we will assess two topological indicators, namely link betweenness and
node similarity, in their ability of characterizing the links which are marginal and thus, a con-
trario, in predicting the links which have not been detected but are likely to exist (missing
links). These two quantities can indeed be used for this exercise, since their value can be natu-
rally associated to a non existing (predicted) link, contrarily to the link weight (i.e. the number
of calls). For this analysis, we will work on the unweighed (binary) network, i.e. we will neglect
the information on the number of calls, both because we want to assess the predicting capabili-
ties of the pure topological information (e.g. who is in contact with whom), and because the
actual benefit of using weights in link prediction is known to be questionable [37].
Link betweenness. Our first hypothesis is that removed links are characterized by low
betweenness. This means that they are redundant in the sense that they connect individuals
who are already connected in some way in the network and do not significantly improve the
flow of information. Networks are generally composed of subgroups (or communities) con-
nected by one or a few links that bridge between them. “Structural holes”[38] are non-redun-
dant contacts that lie in a brokerage position between otherwise disconnected components and
thus facilitate the exchange of information and ideas. Links connecting different communities
have high link betweenness (a generalization of Freeman’s node betweenness [39, 40]), since
they are crucial to connect different parts of a network. Conversely, within-community links
are to some extent redundant and their removal is likely to have little impact on the network.
Our first hypothesis is thus tested through the computation of the link betweenness for both
removed and non-removed links. We recall that, given a link (x, y) 2 Ei connecting nodes x
and y, the link betweenness bxy is the number of shortest paths passing through (x, y), among
those connecting all node pairs (s, t) of the network. More precisely:
bxy ¼
P
s;t2V
Bxyst
Bst
; ð1Þ
where Bst is the number of (equivalently) shortest paths connecting (s, t), and B
xy
st is the number
of such paths passing through (x, y). Betweenness thus emphasizes those links that favor the
exchange of information among network members. The ﬁrst hypothesis thus assumes that
marginal links may have low betweenness and this may explain why they were discarded
throughout the proceedings.
Node similarity. Our second, alternative hypothesis is based on the literature on link pre-
diction. Several studies have applied different link prediction methods to a number of net-
works. They show that nodes are more likely to be connected when they are similar and share a
number of features [22, 23]. According to the second hypothesis, thus, marginal links connect
structurally dissimilar nodes, i.e. individuals who occasionally collaborate but are dissimilar in
terms of interests, background, and involvement in criminal activities. Therefore, these connec-
tions are not crucial for the criminal conducts. The literature proposes several analytical strate-
gies for link prediction, with new methods constantly added, mostly based on measures of
node similarity [24–26]. Given the small size of the Oversize networks, such strategies are a
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viable option, since the exhaustive calculation of similarities for all node pairs is computation-
ally feasible. The hypothesis is that marginal links have low similarity scores and this would
explain their removal.
Node similarity approaches attribute a score sxy to all node pairs (x, y) and, consequently,
induce a ranking of all node pairs. Notice that, if (x, y) 2 Ei (the set of links), sxy can be inter-
preted as a score attributed to the link. Thus, node similarity actually yields a ranking of all the
links Ei. Among the many possible similarity scores, the simplest one amounts at counting the
number of Common Neighbors(CN) of nodes (x, y):
sCNxy ¼ jGðxÞ \ GðyÞj; ð2Þ
where Γ(z) denotes the set of neighbors of node z. The rationale is that (x, y) must have com-
mon features, interests, etc., if they have many common acquaintances. Thus it is likely that
they are directly connected, or that they will in the near future. Empirical evidences of this
assumption have been found in many instances [41, 42].
The CN similarity score can be refined in many ways, e.g. by weighting—not simply count-
ing—the number of common neighbors. One of these ways leads to the definition of the
Resource Allocation (RA) similarity score:
sRAxy ¼
P
z2GðxÞ\GðyÞ
1
kz
; ð3Þ
where kz = |Γ(z)| is the degree of node z. Here, the role of the common neighbor z in connect-
ing (x, y) is diluted if z has many connections, since it will have less resources allocated to
bridge (x, y).
CN and RA are widely used to quantify node similarity. Extensive tests on the capability of a
broad set of indicators (including the two above) in solving the link prediction problem, found
that CN obtains a very good performance despite its extreme simplicity, whereas RA ranks as
one of the best indicators on a large set of benchmark tests [24].
Results
Fig 3 shows the relationship between the number of calls cxy, the betweenness bxy, and the simi-
larity score sxy, both for the whole network NWR and for the marginal links (here we only con-
sider the reduction NWR to NAW for brevity). The figure reveals that all the removed links
collocate among those with low similarity score, whereas we find removed links spread
throughout the entire betweenness range. On the basis of this preliminary observation, we now
consider the two hypotheses above discussed.
Link betweenness
To check the first hypothesis (i.e. the removed links have low betweenness), we compute the
betweenness of all links of the network NWR and we compare their statistics to those of the
links which are removed in passing to NAW or, respectively, NJU. The results are summarized in
Fig 4. The average betweenness of the links of NWR is hbxyiWR = 249.4, and those of the
removed links are not largely dissimilar, namely hbxyiWR ! AW = 300.7 and hbxyiWR ! JU =
238.0, respectively. Incidentally, some of the removed links have betweenness value of the
order of the highest values found in the network (left panels in Fig 4). Furthermore, if we
repeatedly select at random (for 105 repetitions) 58 or, respectively, 134 links to remove (these
are the number of links removed from NWR to NAW and, respectively, from NWR to NJU), we
discover that the average betweenness of the links actually removed is by no means
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anomalously small—in the NWR to NAW case it is even larger than average (right panels in
Fig 4). This leads to the rejection of our first hypothesis.
Node similarity
We now move to our second hypothesis (i.e. the removed links connect structurally dissimilar
nodes) and adopt a strategy common in the research on missing links, i.e. node similarity. We
compute the similarity score sxy (i.e. the similarity of the node pair (x, y)) of all the links of the
network NWR, and we compare their statistics to those of the links which are removed in pass-
ing to NAW or, respectively, NJU. The results are summarized in Fig 5 for the CN similarity
score (Eq (2)). The average score of the links of NWR is hsxyiWR = 0.789, whereas those of the
removed links are much smaller, namely hsxyiWR ! AW = 0.397 and hsxyiWR ! JU = 0.455,
respectively. None of the removed links has a score of the order of the highest values found in
NWR (left panels in Fig 5).
To give statistical significance to the above observation, we repeatedly select at random (for
105 repetitions) the same number of links removed from NWR to NAW and, respectively, from
NWR to NJU (58 or 134 links). The average score of the links actually removed is extremely
small, such that the probability of randomly selecting a smaller average score is p< 0.01 in
Fig 3. The relationship between the number of calls cxy, the link betweenness bxy, and the similarity
score sxy (CN and RA). Each blue cross corresponds to a link (x, y) 2 EWR. Red circles highlight the links
removed in passing from NWR to NAW. The horizontal axis is truncated to improve readability: only 4 links over
247 have cxy > 20, none of which is removed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154244.g003
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both cases (right panels in Fig 5). This means that the link removal process, if assessed in terms
of similarity score sxy, appears to be strongly biased towards the links with least score. In this
respect, the number of calls cxy and the score sxy associated to links seem to play a similar role
in driving the removal process. However, as already pointed out, the former cannot be used for
link prediction purposes.
The above results are confirmed if we instead adopt the RA similarity score (Eq (3)). Here
the average score of the links of NWR is hsxyiWR = 0.124, whereas those of the removed links are
hsxyiWR ! AW = 0.046 and hsxyiWR ! JU = 0.067. Again, the probability of randomly selecting a
smaller average score is p< 0.01 in both cases. Therefore, the hypothesis that removed links
connect individuals who are structurally dissimilar (i.e. individuals who occasionally collaborate
but are different in terms of tasks and involvement in criminal activities) can be accepted. Node
similarity scores can thus be adopted to identify missing links within the Oversize network.
Prediction of missing links
Our goal is now to identify the possible missing links in the Oversize network by inferring
them a contrario, on the basis of the characteristics of the marginal links (i.e. links removed
along the criminal proceedings) identified through the testing of the two hypotheses above. As
a matter of fact, given that the link removal process proved to be strongly biased towards the
Fig 4. Statistics on the betweenness bxy of the removed links. Left panels: in green, the histogram of the betweenness of the links ofNWR. In yellow, the
betweenness of the links removed in passing from NWR to NAW (above, 58 removals), and from NWR to NJU (below, 134 removals). Right panels: the
distribution of the average betweenness of a random sample of 58 links (above) or 134 links (below) of NWR, compared with the average betweenness (red
vertical line) of the links actually removed from NWR to NAW (above) and from NWR to NJU (below).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154244.g004
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smallest similarity scores, it is reasonable to presume that unobserved links (i.e. pairs of actors)
with large similarity scores might be connected by missing links. In other words, if a small sim-
ilarity between two actors—although connected—reveals the marginality of their link, a large
similarity should be indicative of a connection, even when the link was not identified by law
enforcement agencies. The procedure of attributing large likelihood of existence to links con-
necting highly similar nodes is at the basis of network reconstruction in all those fields where
the knowledge of the complex set of interactions among agents is admittedly largely incom-
plete, such as for instance in social [12] or biological networks [43].
Let us first consider the CN score, defined by Eq (2). If we compute the similarity sxy of the
247 links of the networkNWR, we find that they range from 0 to 7, with average value hsxyi =
0.789. On the other hand, if we compute sxy for all (x, y) =2 EWR, i.e. for all node pairs not directly
connected, we find values ranging from 0 to 5, but a much smaller average hsxyi = 0.123. Indeed,
if we exhaustively consider all the combinations of a pair (x, y) 2 EWR with another (x, y) =2 EWR,
we find that the latter has a higher sxy than the former in 19.7% of the cases only.
Since sxy is significantly higher for pairs (x, y) directly connected, it is reasonable to presume
that those pairs (x, y) =2 EWR with extremely large sxy be actually connected by a missing link,
i.e. a link existing but not experimentally observed. More precisely, if we set a threshold value S
Fig 5. Statistics on the similarity score sxy (CN) of the removed links. Left panels: in green, the histogram of the score of the links of NWR (247 links). In
yellow, the score of the links removed in passing from NWR to NAW (above, 58 removals), and fromNWR to NJU (below, 134 removals). Right panels: the
distribution of the average score of a random sample of 58 links (above) or 134 links (below) of NWR, compared with the average score (red vertical line) of the
links actually removed from NWR to NAW (above) and from NWR to NJU (below).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154244.g005
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(typically large), we can compute the fraction α (typically small) of existing links (x, y) 2 EWR
with sxy S. If we now take a pair (x0, y0) =2 EWR such that sx0 y0  S, then the probability that
sx0 y0  sxy is larger than 1 − α (i.e. typically large) for whatever (x, y) 2 EWR, namely the pre-
dicted link (x0, y0) collocates among the node pairs with higher similarity.
Fig 6 reports the relationship between the similarity threshold S, the number of predicted
links Npred, and the link “reliability” 1 − α. In the following we focus our discussion on S = 3, a
value which corresponds to 1 − α 0.90 and to a number of 17 predicted links (among the |V|
(|V| − 1)/2 − |EWR| = 16224 pairs non directly connected). It is a reasonable trade off between a
too tight (S = 4, with Npred = 3) and a too loose threshold (S = 2, with Npred = 100), as the num-
ber of predicted links is of the order of roughly one tenth of the existing links. The predicted
links are highlighted in Fig 7. Notice that they mostly connect nodes with large centrality (i.e.
k-shell coreness), and thus they could represent important, yet overlooked, relationships
among key individuals.
In the light of that, we carried out a new campaign of analysis of the judicial documents to
discover clues of the possible connections among the relevant individuals: the results are dis-
cussed below and summarized in Table 2. It should be emphasized that the absence of the pre-
dicted links from the original network NWR essentially means that those connections have not
corresponded to a recorded telephone call in the period of investigation (see the Discussion
section for an overview of possible motivations). This does not exclude, however, the existence
of a social connection of whatever nature, which is crucial to be discovered in order to have the
most possible complete picture of the criminal network.
Fig 6. Link prediction with CN similarity score. The plot visualizes the relationship between the number of
predicted links Npred, the link reliability 1 − α, and the similarity threshold S. The inset replicates the part of the
plot with the highest reliability values.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154244.g006
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Node similarity predicts a link between n49 and n27, two of the main traffickers within the
criminal network; n49 is the son of the boss and, with his father in jail, he was in charge of the
trafficking activities, the management of the criminal group, and the investment of the pro-
ceeds of crime in both legal and illegal activities; n27 was heavily involved in the drug traffick-
ing activities; in particular, he was charged with being responsible of the purchase and retail of
large quantities of cocaine. Considering their role within the criminal group, it is highly proba-
ble that the two knew each other personally and had contacts. Similar considerations apply to
the missing link identified between n49 and n48, who was in charge of the wholesale distribu-
tion of the drug in the province of Lecco, in the north of Italy. The judicial documents suggest
that they collaborated with the mediation of other members of the criminal organization.
Fig 7. Link prediction. The Oversize networkNWR of theWiretap Records (nodes and links in grey), with the 17 predicted links with largest CN similarity
score sxy (in blue). Nodes are colored according to their coreness based on the k-shell analysis (1 = white (most peripheral), 2 = yellow, 3 = orange, 4 = brown
(most central)). The two parts of the network most relevant for link prediction are magnified in the bottom.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154244.g007
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However, both n49 and n48 lived in the same area and had key roles in the drug distribution
chain, increasing the likelihood of a link between the two, as identified by the node similarity
scores.
Node similarity also predicts a link between n50 and n160. The former is n49’s brother, also
involved in drug trafficking activities. The latter is a fugitive who acted as a broker in the
wholesale of drug. His being on the run was favored by n49, who provided constant support to
n160. Considering the strong link between n49 and n160, and the close relationship between
n49 and n50, it is likely that n50 and n160 also knew each other personally. Another predicted
link is the one between n118, who is the wife of n45, and n36. Indeed, n118 is one of the few
women suspected of being involved in the illicit activities of the criminal group. She was aware
of her husband’s involvement in drug trafficking and her telephone calls discussing drug debts
were intercepted by the police. The husband of n118 used to buy cocaine from n36 on behalf of
other members of the criminal organization. The two men’s frequent contacts and n118’s
involvement in illicit activities indicate that n118 and n36 may have known each other. The
likelihood of a link between n13 and n43, also predicted by node similarity measures, is con-
firmed by a telephone call intercepted by Italian law enforcement agencies during the investiga-
tion. No conversations were recorded between the two alleged criminals; however, in June
2004 n13 informed another member of the organization of n43’s arrest, indicating that n13
and n43 knew each other.
Other links predicted by the CN similarity score include those forming a closed triad among
n40, n53, and n147. The three suspects were involved in the drug retail in the province of Lecco
and they used to buy the drug from the same wholesalers. As for n49 and n48, sharing drug dis-
tribution channels and operating in the same area justifies high node similarity scores. Nodes
n40, n53, and n147 all share a missing link with n48’s boss n19, a drug trafficker involved in the
wholesale of cocaine in the province of Lecco. A direct link between n19 and the three retailers
was never confirmed by the police; however, the four suspects had trade relationships through
Table 2. The 17 predicted links with largest CN similarity score, with the specification of the role of the
individuals involved. For all predicted links, with the only exception of (n5, n39), the analysis of the judicial
documents finds evidence of the likelihood of a social tie.
predicted link (x, y) node x node y
(n49, n27) boss’ son and important drug dealer important drug dealer
(n49, n48) boss’ son and important drug dealer drug wholesaler
(n50, n160) n49’s brother and drug dealer fugitive and broker
(n118, n36) n45’s wife drug dealer
(n13, n43) drug dealer drug dealer
(n40, n53) drug retailer drug retailer
(n40, n147) drug retailer drug retailer
(n53, n147) drug retailer drug retailer
(n19, n40) n48’s boss and important drug dealer drug retailer
(n19, n53) n48’s boss and important drug dealer drug retailer
(n19, n147) n48’s boss and important drug dealer drug retailer
(n24, n48) n19’s assistant drug wholesaler
(n24, n147) n19’s assistant drug retailer
(n28, n26) n27’s younger brother n27’s assistant and drug wholesaler
(n28, n140) n27’s younger brother n27’s assistant and drug wholesaler
(n26, n140) n27’s assistant and drug wholesaler n27’s assistant and drug wholesaler
(n5, n39) ’recruiter’ and drug dealer drug wholesaler
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154244.t002
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n19’s subordinates, including n48, and they may have known each other personally. Two links
were also predicted between n19’s assistant n24, and n48 and n147, respectively. The need to
balance security and efficiency may have resulted in a division of labor between n19 and n24,
with the former dealing cocaine with n48 and—indirectly—n147, and the latter having contacts
with other wholesalers and retailers in the Lecco province. The strong relationship between n19
and n24, however, makes the predicted links very likely to have existed in the criminal organiza-
tion. Another closed triad is formed by predicted links among n28, n26, and n140: as a matter of
fact, n28 is n27’s younger brother; his activities included blending and hiding cocaine before its
sale. The drug was then distributed by n27 with the help of n26, n140 and other wholesalers.
Although no conversations or meetings were recorder among n28, n26, and n140, it is thus
likely that they knew each other or had contacts in the past.
Overall, the thorough analysis of the judicial documents allowed us to validate, with a rea-
sonable degree of reliability, 16 out of 17 of the links predicted by the CN similarity scores.
We now move to investigating the predicting capabilities of the RA similarity score, defined
by Eq (3). The relationship between the similarity threshold S, the number of predicted links
Npred, and the link “reliability” 1 − α is not only qualitatively, but also quantitatively very simi-
lar to that displayed in Fig 6 for the CN score (we omit the figure for the sake of conciseness).
In particular, to facilitate a direct comparison with the CN results, we select again a threshold
value (in this case S = 0.45) such that 17 links are predicted with a reliability 1 − α 0.90. It
turns out that the links predicted by RA have only a partial overlap with those predicted by
CN, since only 5 links out of 17 are designated by both methods. The attempt of validating the
12 new links through the analysis of the judicial documents, however, was not conclusive: no
strong evidences were found for them, contrarily to what above described for the CN score.
It seems therefore that the RA similarity score, in this specific case, has a weaker predicting
capability than the CN score. With the aim of interpreting this fact, we focus on the 12 links
predicted by RA but not by CN: notice that, having selected S = 3 for CN, they necessarily cor-
respond to node pairs having exactly 1 or 2 common neighbors. Non connected pairs, i.e.
(x, y) =2 EWR, have a maximum RA score of about sxy = 0.625. In view of Eq (3), to get a top-
ranking RA score it is sufficient to have a common neighbor which is exclusive to the node pair
(i.e. a degree 2 node) since this guarantees sxy 0.5 (only 12 node pairs out of 16224 meet this
Fig 8. Examples of local topologies around predicted links. The left panel portrays the portion of the NWR network around the link (n19, n147), predicted
by the CN score (incidentally, (n13, n43) is also a predicted link). The right panel portrays the portion of network around the link (n9, n43) predicted by the RA
score.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154244.g008
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inequality). This represents a peculiar form of connection, especially if we compare it with the
typical scenario of CN top-ranking pairs, which are instead connected by 4 or 5 common
neighbors. Fig 8 displays two representative cases of predicted links which are in the top rank-
ing positions for CN and RA, respectively, but are not predicted by the other method. The local
network structure appears to be strongly different: in the CN case, the predicted link is
immersed in a dense community, contrarily to the RA case. Indeed, if we compute the average
clustering coefficient of the nodes connecting the predicted links which are not in common
between the two methods, we find cavg = 0.431 for CN and cavg = 0.090 for RA, a clear indica-
tion of a different local topology. On the other hand, the local topology around the link pre-
dicted by RA suggests that n149 is likely to have the peculiar role of brokering two important
subnetworks (notice the large number of neighbors of n9 and n43). If it is so, it is not suprising
that no direct connection should exist, as the intermediation is exerted precisely by n149.
To further explore which link prediction methods are appropriate in this specific case, we
broaden the scope of the analysis by testing two additional methods, namely the Katz index
similarity (e.g., [24]) and the Structural Perturbation Method (SPM) [25]. Both of them are
global, i.e., the likelihood of a predicted link depends on the entire network. This is not the case
for the CN and RA methods, which are based on a similarity score sxy whose value only
depends on the local structure of the network around (x, y).
Given an undirected, unweighed network with adjacency matrix A, the Katz index defines
the similarity of nodes (x, y) by
sKatzxy ¼ bAxy þ b2ðA2Þxy þ b3ðA3Þxy þ . . . ¼ ðI  bAÞ1  I
 
xy
; ð4Þ
where 0< β< 1/λmax(A) to ensure convergence. By recalling that (A
k)xy is the number of paths
of length k connecting (x, y), and noting that Axy = 0 if the link (x, y) does not exist (which is
the case when we quantify the likelihood of (x, y) for prediction), we interpret Eq (4) as a gener-
alization of the CN score, since it considers the paths of all lengths connecting (x, y) instead of
those of length 2 only, which are those passing through the common neighbors.
For the network NWR we have λmax(A) = 7.07 and thus 0< β< 0.141. To facilitate the com-
parison with the results above discussed, we select again the top-17 predicted links according
to index Eq (4). It turns out that the 17 predicted links are the same as those of CN in the range
0< β< 0.060, while for β = 0.100 the links predicted in common by Katz and CN reduce to 13
(but only 4 in common by Katz and RA). Interestingly, the 4 new links predicted by Katz (they
are (n9, n39), (n13, n40), (n24, n40), (n43, n143)) are, in the CN ranking, in the set immedi-
ately below the top-17. Most notably, we were able to find in the judicial documents clear evi-
dence of the likelihood of these social ties (we omit the details for brevity). Overall, we can
safely claim that the results of the global link prediction method based on Katz similarity are
consistent with those of the CN approach and, as such, they depart significantly from those
obtained by the RA method.
The SPM considers the set of predicted links as a perturbation of the nominal network
(coded by the adjacency matrix A) which, however, preserves its structural features (see [25]
for details). To quantify the sensitivity to perturbations, a small portion of links are randomly
selected and removed, so that we can write A = AR + ΔA with the (symmetric) matrix ΔA con-
taining the removed links. Then AR is decomposed according to its eigenbasis:
AR ¼
XjVj
k¼1
lkvkv
T
k ; ð5Þ
where |V| is the number of nodes and λk and vk are the eigenvalue of A
R and the corresponding
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orthogonal and normalized eigenvector, respectively. The perturbed matrix is obtained as
~A ¼
XjVj
k¼1
lk þ
vTkDAvk
vTk vk
 
vkv
T
k ; ð6Þ
which can be interpreted as an approximation of A in a linear expansion based on AR. In prac-
tice, ~A will be obtained as the average of many instances of Eq (6), each one computed for a dif-
ferent random removal ΔA. Finally, the predicted links (x, y) are those with largest ~Axy among
the node pairs non connected in the original network, i.e., those with Axy = 0.
If we apply the SPM to the adjacency matrix A of the network NWR, we find a set of top-17
predicted links which overlaps with that of the CN method by 11 to 14 links, according to
parametrization (number of random removals and fraction of removed links). The links in
common with RA, instead, are never more than 4. In all instances, the new links predicted by
SPM turn out to be, in the CN ranking, in the set immediately below the top-17. As for the
Katz index described above, the results of the SPM prediction are largely consistent with those
of the CN approach and, on the contrary, depart significantly from those obtained by the RA
method.
To summarize the results of the link prediction analysis, we have found three different
methods (one local, CN, and two global, Katz index and SPM) whose results are largely over-
lapping. Most notably, these results find significant validation in the judicial documentation,
since they correspond to social ties not included in wiretap records but nonetheless very likely
to exist. On the other hand, the fourth method, RA, does not seem an appropriate tool for link
prediction in this specific case: its results are divergent with respect to the other methods and,
moreover, its predicted links cannot be validated through the available documents. Of course,
the most general question on which other methods, among the many available [22–26, 44], are
appropriate in this specific context remains open. However, our analysis indicates that a few
methods able to provide reliable predictions do exist. Among them, CN should certainly be
appreciated for its conceptual simplicity and easy computability.
Discussion
The rejection of the first hypothesis, according to which marginal (i.e. discarded) links are
those with low betweenness, has some interesting implications. From a network analysis stand-
point, it is a fact that the criminal justice system discarded as marginal a number of links with
high betweenness. This may appear surprising, as these links connected not only peripheral
nodes but also nodes with medium-high coreness. Thus, they may appear to bridge the “struc-
tural holes” within the criminal group [38]. In fact, a careful analysis reveals that links with
high betweenness include a few occasional contacts or communications unrelated to the illicit
activities. Despite their apparent bridging function, from a criminal intelligence standpoint
these links are marginal. Overall, we must conclude that link betweenness proved to be unable
to discriminate between marginal and important links in the criminal network.
The second hypothesis, based on node similarity, performed definitely better in the identifi-
cation of marginal links. The link removal process independently conducted by the criminal
justice system focused on links with low similarity, whereas in all instances it considered as rel-
evant those links with high similarity. This demonstrates that node similarity matters beyond
the merely topological analysis, as we have evidence that it is also naturally embedded in the
activities of the law enforcement agencies.
The specific nature of the criminal case and the design of the study prevent an exhaustive
and conclusive verification of the predicted links. In this study, instead, it is possible to verify
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the prediction through independent analysis of the judicial sources. The information of the
case shows that social ties corresponding to the predicted links are, in almost all instances, very
likely to have existed in the criminal organization, although undetected by investigators and
thus not annotated in the Oversize networks. Reasons for overlooking predicted links include
suspects’ use of communication and protection methods, investigators’ limited time and
resources, and reliance on imperfect data-gathering methods (e.g. covert observations, infor-
mants, witnesses)[5, 7–9]. It is also worth noting that strong empirical evidence from wiretaps
or other investigative sources must be available to include a link between any two suspects in
the judicial documents. Investigators may have suspected some of the predicted links without
being able to demonstrate their actual existence. At the same time, since criminals face a trade-
off between efficiency and security, they may have deployed several security strategies against
law enforcement surveillance, thus impeding the detection of their interactions [13, 15].
Conclusions
Previous studies suggest that various fields of law enforcement may benefit from SNA: identifi-
cation of suitable targets for network destabilization and prediction of the impact of their
removal; detection of aliases through the analysis of actors with similar patterns of connections;
and identification of potential defectors according to their position in the network [2, 45]. In
this paper, we show how SNAmay support criminal intelligence analysis and ongoing investi-
gations by identifying missing links among suspects.
This study demonstrated that node similarity, already applied in different fields for link pre-
diction, can identify possible missing links also in criminal networks, when information is
noisy or incomplete almost by definition. The criminal justice system deploys a number of
guarantees against false positives such as incorrect accusations and interactions unrelated to
criminal conducts. Conversely, effective strategies to prevent false negatives, such as missing
information, are scarce. Due to constrained data collection resources, law enforcement agencies
may indeed miss some actors and links, with negative consequences on intelligence and investi-
gation activities. This applies to drug trafficking networks, such as the Oversize network, as
well as to other types of covert networks including street gangs and terrorist groups. These
criminal organizations can all be conceived as networks of relations among co-offenders based
on kinship or criminal collaboration. Since the social network approach to crime focuses on
the relationships among co-offenders rather than, e.g. their illicit activities [46], SNA can be
used to analyze any type of criminal networks, from small and flexible groups of collaborating
criminals to more structured organizations.
Node similarity measures helped identify the characteristics of the links independently
removed throughout the criminal proceedings: the removal process was strongly biased
towards the links with least node similarity score. This provided support to the hypothesis that
links discarded by the investigators throughout the criminal proceedings connect individuals
that are structurally dissimilar, i.e. they link individuals who occasionally collaborate but are
dissimilar in terms of tasks and involvement in criminal activities. Therefore, the removed
links are not crucial for the criminal conducts. Consequently, node similarity enabled predic-
tion of links that are likely to exist, but that were undetected by the police. Missing links were
inferred a contrario from the characteristics of removed links, on the assumption that pairs of
unconnected actors with large node similarity scores were likely connected by missing links,
but for several reasons went unnoticed by law enforcement agencies. Content analysis of the
judicial sources independently corroborates the likelihood of predicted links. Moreover, the
comparative analysis of different similarity scores reveals that not all of them have the same
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predictive capability: we argue that the reason lies in the different topological properties they
highlight.
In conclusion, the results show that node similarity measures can inform ongoing criminal
investigations. On one hand, the independent link reduction conducted by the law enforce-
ment agencies confirms node similarity as an important property of relevant links. On the
other hand, link prediction may point out where to direct the scarce investigative resources for
more effective investigations or even uncover relevant patterns overlooked by law enforcement
authorities, especially in the case of investigations targeting large networks or criminal organi-
zations with sophisticated communication and protection methods. Besides their practical
implications, the results extend the prediction of missing links to a field largely neglected so
far.
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